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Abstract
This paper presents the different utilitarian approaches to ethics.
It stresses the influence of utilitarianism in economics in general and in
welfare economics in particular. The key idea of the paper to explain
the evolution from classical utilitarianism to preferences utilitarian-
ism and towards post-welfarist approaches is the following. Utility is
defined normatively and positively. This generates some serious ten-
sions. Utilitarianism needs to evolve to go beyond this ethical tension.
Another idea defended in this paper is that the solutions developed
by utilitarianism to solve the ethical issue eventually reinforces oper-
ational problems. This raises a legitimacy issue as whether the in-
tervention of utilitarian economists in public decision are likely to be
normatively transparent.
JEL Codes: A13,A33,B10,B2, D63
Key-words: Utilitarianism, Welfarism, Hedonism, Preference, Utility
Introduction
While there is wide variation in utilitarian approaches to ethics, they
are united by their endorsement of the following general principle: the
morally right action is judged through the goodness of its outcomes
∗To be published in Gilbert Faccarello and Heinz Kurz Eds. Handbook of the His-
tory of Economic Analysis, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, Cheltenham (U.K.), Vol.3:
Developments in major fields of economics
†GATE L-SE, Universite´ de Lyon, Lyon, F-69007 France; CNRS, GATE Lyon Saint-
Etienne, Ecully, F-69130, France; and Universite´ Jean Monnet, Saint-Etienne, F-42000,
France. Contact: antoinette.baujard@univ-st-etienne.fr, (33) +4 77 42 13 61.
1
for society, and, conversely, what is good for society is based on what
is good for individuals.
Utilitarianism, as a family of philosophical theories, has been the
most powerful and pervasive approach in the development of eco-
nomics since the marginalist revolution. Utilitarianism was developed
in the 18th century and then fully articulated in the 19th, designed
to do good to the world not from the point of view of the Christian
church or any religion, but rather from a secular point of view based
on rational thought. It was conceived as a way to think about the legal
system, and to improve it, on the basis of a single coherent rational
and acceptable principle, that of the utility principle. It hence may be
used to think about the constitution, about civil and penal laws, and,
last but not least, any kind of policy judgment whether economic or
social. Economics has endorsed some important aspects of utilitari-
anism ever since the 18th century. In particular, welfare economics,
and hence virtually every public policy recommendation formulated
by economists, has for years been influenced by utilitarianism in some
manner, albeit not always explicitly recognized. The efforts to get
away from utilitarianism may even explain aspects of the evolution of
welfare economics (See Baujard 2012).
Utilitarianism is not only a moral and political philosophy, how-
ever; it is also a philosophy of action. As an ethical theory, it sets
down what individuals should do to improve their own situation, and
what should be done by every individual and by the collectivity to im-
prove collective welfare. As a theory of action, utilitarianism claims
that individuals seek to promote their own utility, such that utility ap-
pears as both an explanation of and a guide for human action. Notice
that utilitarianism is sometimes claimed to be rooted in a consider-
ation of strictly selfish actions, with no attention paid to the utility
of others: but this is merely an exaggerated caricature of the theory.
Being motivated by one’s own pleasure does not require that this plea-
sure be exclusively self-oriented. There certainly exist extra-regarding
pleasures, functioning as truly motivating factors, such that seeking
one’s own self-interest does not imply that one disregard the fate of
others. The ideational evolution in the utilitarian philosophy of ac-
tion is exactly parallel to that in utilitarian moral philosophy. In the
classical versions of utilitarianism, pleasure guides human actions, as
a psychological hedonistic law would suggest. The theory has then
moved away from hedonism to consider that the psychological law at
stake is the search for the satisfaction of preferences, no matter what
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these preferences are made of, and no matter what their substantive
cause. We have resolved not to discuss other aspects of the utilitar-
ianist philosophy of action in this paper, in so far as this is closely
connected to standard rational choice theory as used in economics:
we refer the interested reader to decision theory and the associated
heterodox literature.
As a way of setting out the diversity of utilitarian approaches,
this chapter has chosen the following as a key idea. Utility has a
plural nature: it is both positive and normative, and it is normative
not only for every individual, but normative also for the collectivity.
This plurality generates tensions. The effort to reconcile these tensions
explains the diversity of utilitarian doctrines as well as their evolution,
both within classical utilitarian theories and contemporary theories,
and even the development from hedonist utilitarianism to preference
utilitarianism.
Classical utilitarianism mostly retained a hedonistic interpretation
of utility. It is a doctrine that, in its standard 19th century formula-
tion, meant the promotion of the greatest happiness for the greatest
number (Section 1). Contemporary utilitarianism can be defined as
the combination of act consequentialism, welfarism, and a principle
of sum-ranking (Sen 1979c). Consequentialism implies that an action
is moral if and only if the social outcome of the resulting state of
the world is good. Welfarism is the principle that the goodness of an
outcome depends solely on individual utilities and on no other infor-
mation. Sum-ranking says that the appropriate method of aggregation
is to add individual utilities. Contemporary approaches in utilitari-
anism develop refinements of preferences utilitarianism (Section 2).
There are also a wide range of anti-utilitarian theories, which do not
in general question the premiss that more goodness is better than less,
but rather question the ethical implications of monism—the exclusive
focus on utility as opposed to other values—, the priority of goodness
over fairness, or the democratic failures of utilitarianism. In the eco-
nomics literature, the alternative to utilitarianism is often supposed
to be represented by the Rawlsian theory, as generally encapsulated
in the famous Bentham–Rawls opposition. Rawls has indeed been im-
portant in making it acceptable to call into question the assertion of
an all-powerful and uncontested utilitarianism. There now exists a
diversity of critiques and alternatives to utilitarianism (Section 3).
3
1 Early and classical utilitarianism
The proto-history of utilitarianism goes back to the British moralists
of the 17th century, including Richard Cumberland and John Gay, who
defended the link between individual morality and the general good.
The early utilitarians were influenced by the materialist Helve´tius,
who claimed that interest dictates judgments, and stressed the im-
portance of education in the formation of human souls; as well as by
Francis Hutcheson and David Hume, who held that a kind of com-
monsense morality is generally compatible with public utility. (For
more details on the precursors of utilitarianism, see e.g., Rosen 2003,
Driver 2009).
For further discussion of these authors, we refer the readers to the
relevant chapters in the handbook edited by Faccarello and Kurz. Our
aim in this section is rather to present the historical stages of classical
utilitarianism, defined as follows:
The utilitarian doctrine is, that happiness is desirable, and
the only thing desirable, as an end; all other thing being
only desirable as means to that end. (Mill 1861: 15)
1.1 Utilitarian hedonism
Bentham (1748–1832) is generally considered the father of actual utili-
tarianism. The principle of utility—the“greatest happiness principle”
or “the greatest happiness for the greatest number”—is the funda-
mental utilitarian principle, as expressed in this famous passage:
Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two
sovereign masters, pains and pleasure. It is for them alone
to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine
what we shall do. On the one hand the standard of right
and wrong, on the other the chain of causes and effects, are
fastened to their throne. They govern us in all we do, in all
we say, in all we think [...]The principle of utility recognizes
this subjection, and assumes it for the foundation of that
system, the object of which is to rear the fabric of felicity
by the hands or reason and of law. (Bentham 1789: 1–2)
Bentham sometimes alludes to the sum of individual utility, but the
commitment of classical utilitarianism to the principle of the sum does
not seem as robust and important as that of two other essential prin-
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ciples: impartiality and welfarism. Impartiality means that everyone
counts for one and none for more than one. Welfarism is the focus
on individual utility. Utility is conceived as a mental state repre-
senting happiness, the positive result of a balance between pains and
pleasures or any personal valuable feelings. Individual utilities are
calculated in three stages (Baujard 2009). First, Bentham lists the
different classes of elementary pleasures or pains. Second, the value of
utility is assessed according to different criteria including intensity, du-
ration, certainty or uncertainty, propinquity or remoteness, fecundity,
purity and extent. Finally, the result of this calculation is adjusted
to each individual on the basis of the circumstances that influence
her sensitivity. Since the idea of measuring pleasures and comparing
them raises many practical problems, Bentham proposes to use some
proxy for estimating it, and money may be able to provide the needed
measuring rod—this being the ancestor of the idea of the willingness
to pay or to accept. More generally, there is a global assumption ac-
cording to which everyone shares vital concerns including security of
expectations, subsistence, abundance and equality, such that rights
are associated to all these goals.
A tension lies in the duality of utility, which is supposed both to
explain and justify actions. Why would an action that is desired by
an individual always be good for her? And, moreover, why would it
be good for society? Is vice really undesirable and virtue desirable?
Should individuals sacrifice their happiness for that of others? There
can be tensions between the reach of the individual’s happiness and
that of society, which utilitarianism shall need to reconcile.
Bentham recognizes there may be mistakes, cognitive limits, or
more fundamentally what we would call now external effects—as in-
troduced by the criteria of fecundity, purity and extent— that are
likely to hamper the ideal conjunction of individual interests. When-
ever utility is likely not to be maximized, Bentham designs external
punishments and rewards, and appeals to various kinds of influence
(such as peer pressure) to make sure that individuals are incited to re-
vert to a better action, so that egoistic people, or people who might be
wrong, bad at calculating, or insufficiently informed, will eventually
act to maximize social utility.
John Stuart Mill’s utilitarianism (1806-1873), influenced by per-
fectionist intuitions, is also meant to answer objections such as those
levelled at Bentham’s theory. Among other insights, he recognizes that
all pleasures do not seem equally valuable, as evoked in a celebrated
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passage:
It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig
satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool sat-
isfied. And if the fool, or the pig, are of a different opinion,
it is because they only know their own side of the question.
(Mill 1861: 37)
Mill’s utilitarianism is able to discriminate higher moral and aesthetic
sentiments from sources of swinish pleasure. His proof for his principle
of ranking is based on the fact that those who have experienced both
kinds of pleasures know which is more valuable; this is why we speak
of Mill’s qualitative utilitarianism.
The details of the consideration of different sources of pleasure as
set out in Mill’s view has led certain authors to regret Mill’s “naturalist
fallacy” (Moore 1903). In order to distinguish between different kinds
of pleasures, we need to suppose there exists another value, other than
utility, which has intrinsic importance, such that some specific actions
are good by their nature rather than by their actual consequences.
1.2 From utilitarianism to economics
Henry Sidgwick’s (1838–1900; See Vol. 1) The methods of ethics has
been influential in the clarification of important features of utilitari-
anism and as regards some developments of the marginalist literature
in economics. First, he shows that utilitarianism can resolve any con-
flicts of values or rules, at least under the principle that an ethical
agent must be impartial between one person’s pleasures and another’s.
Sidgwick, though, made an important case for criticizing the hedonist
approach in utilitarianism: a problem of “dualism of practical reason”
occurs when it seems better on utilitarian grounds to sacrifice one’s
own interests for others’. Some economists, notably Jevons (1871),
and more recently Skyrms (1996) among many others, have answered
this problem by defending the claim that utility was made a moral
norm through socio-evolutionary explanations of the emergence and
reinforcement of utilitarian rules, so that the existence of a link be-
tween the normative and the positive approaches to utility does not
seem implausible.
Second, Sidgwick discusses the impact of time and population on
utilitarianism. He tackles the problem of the sacrifice of a present
pleasure for a greater one in the future, seeing this as parallel to the
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sacrifice of one’s own pleasure for somebody else’s. Francis Ysidro
Edgeworth (1845–1926) assumed that natural units of pleasure and
pain can in principle be ascertained and aggregated over varying pop-
ulations and time horizons. The population issue later came to be the
subject of extensively study (Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson 2005).
In modern utilitarianism, social welfare is optimized when the sum of
individual cardinal utilities is maximized. Derek Parfit (1984) showed
that sum utilitarianism was exaggeratedly populationist, because it
implies what he called ‘the repugnant conclusion’: that a numerous
and miserable population is to be judged better off than a sparse and
happy one. Conversely, average utilitarianism would be Malthusian
because new inhabitants provide a distinct value according to whether
they are more or less happy.
Third, Sidgwick stressed the need for developing formal models of
a utilitarian calculus under ideal conditions so that the implications
of quantitative hedonistic utilitarian reasoning could be clarified. The
utilitarian economists have gone beyond his original intentions. They
have assumed that the utility numbers are known with precision, which
allows them to compute properly interpersonal comparisons of utilities
and the sum of utilities in every situation. An issue is thus raised as to
who shall be responsible for performing and enforcing the utilitarian
calculations. Edgeworth and others have considered it best to trust a
utilitarian elite for this delicate task. Along the same line, Sidgwick
made a point of insisting that the utilitarian theory should not be
publicized, because uneducated people, those incapable of moral re-
flection, may misuse it. Utilitarian rules should thus rather be applied
by educated people, while the laymen should be content to be gov-
erned by the utilitarian elite. This corresponds to the colonial elitism
of Sidgwick’s times, which Bernard Williams (1973) derisively called
“Government House Utilitarianism”. It is hard to deny that utilitari-
anism in this sense utterly contradicts individual sovereignty, at least
that of allegedly uneducated persons.
2 Contemporary utilitarianism
The ordinalist revolution that affected economic science from Pareto
to the thirties watershed has totally modified the definition of utility
in economics: in order to secure economics’ status as a science, it was
necessary to exclude the hedonist interpretation of utility and favor
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the preference interpretation; this move was completed by the revealed
preference theory (Baujard 2013). A similar evolution occurred in the
utilitarian philosophical literature, especially in the second part of the
twentieth century. Both in economics and in philosophy, the model
of utility as a measure of pleasure has now been replaced by the pref-
erence model (on the comparison of the two models, see e.g., Haslett
1990). Preference utilitarianism also corresponds to a preference view
of welfare: if you prefer x to y, it also follows you are better off in x
than in y.
2.1 Harsanyi’s rational choice utilitarianism
Harsanyi’s (1953,1955) articles are both leading contributions to mod-
ern utilitarianism. The 1953 paper offers a philosophical reconstruc-
tion of the notion of utilitarian impartiality. Harsanyi imagines that
an impartial spectator compares the utility of two populations. The
fiction ought to help derive a function of social welfare from individual
utilities, capturing the fact that social utility is based on the individ-
uals’ personal assessment of their situation. A primary requirement
is that the spectator should be impartial, that is to say, he should
not favor the situation of one individual over another, whatever their
differences. For instance, a poorer person should not be favored over
a richer one, nor the converse. Everyone is hence given a strictly equal
weight. Harsanyi’s innovative idea was to extract this reasoning from
the context of risk theory. Say you were to become one person in a
given population: you have as much chance of becoming one person
as any other—as much chance of being rich as poor. From outside,
and not knowing who you end up eventually to be, you have no reason
to favor one person over another in revealing your preference, so that
you should consider being any person in the society with equal chance.
You therefore want to maximize the sum of all individual utilities—
for a given population, equivalently, the average utility. Impartiality
is enforced by the fiction of a (thin) veil of ignorance.
In his 1955 article, Harsanyi provides an axiomatic justification of
the criterion of the sum. Based on the von Neumman and Morgenstern
characterization of utility under risk, Harsanyi treats the individual
reasoning under the veil of ignorance we described above. For any
weights ai, and for utility ui of all the individuals i of the society
composed of N individuals, he obtains the following characterization
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of weighted utilitarianism:
W =
∑
i∈N
ai.ui
This “construction” of what utility should be under impartiality
entails there exist two definitions of utility. Actual utility—or sub-
jective utility—corresponds to a numerical indicator of preferences,
which is revealed by actual choice behavior. Such utilities are ordi-
nal, and neither cardinal measures nor comparisons of utility in this
sense are meaningful. By contrast, moral utilities are cardinal and in-
terpersonally comparable. The identification of moral utility requires
certain conditions to enforce impartiality. This is the task of the veil of
ignorance. Furthermore, imagine that i is an altruistic person, whose
utility is increasing with j’s utility. Then j’s utility is likely to be
counted twice, in contravention of the impartiality criterion. Other-
regarding preferences should therefore be excluded in order to avoid
such double-counting (Dworkin 1978).
Since their publication, however, the implications of Harsanyi’s
results have spilled over into diverse issues: the interpretation of pos-
sible negative weights, problems of distribution, cardinality, difficulty
with the introduction of subjective and heterogeneous utility, incon-
sistencies, etc. Here we restrict ourselves to alluding to one of the
most famous outcomes, the rich debate between Rawls and Harsanyi
(e.g., Rawls 1974, Harsanyi 1975). The reasoning under uncertainty
on which Harsanyi’s utilitarian social welfare function is based relies
heavily on the specifics of his choices regarding risk aversion. Imagine
you do not even know the list of all possible situations: you then face a
situation of uncertainty rather than a risky situation. You can hardly
weight all the possible situations equally, while you may fear falling
into the worst situation. John Rawls (1971) considered that the latter
fiction was a better fit for his criterion of impartiality. He proposed a
thick veil of ignorance, such that the maximin criterion would be more
suitable. In the end, utilitarian impartiality implies the maximization
of the sum of utilities, while the Rawlsian theory of justice as fairness
entails devoting all attention to the most disfavored group in society.
As a consequence, the former ignores all distributive issues while the
latter is fundamentally egalitarian.
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2.2 Preference utilitarianism
Most modern contributions to utilitarianism retain the preference model
of utility, such that utility is simply the satisfaction of preferences. The
‘strong preference’ model is the one that is most commonly used in so-
cial sciences: individual preferences are revealed in the actual choices
of individuals. Specifically, utilities are the numerical representation
of preferences as revealed by choices. If I choose wine when I could
drink tea, my preference is for wine over tea. In terms of utility, the
numerical value of the utility that I associate with wine is therefore
greater than the one I associate with tea. For example, I can capture
either the choice situation or the preference by the following utility
numbers: U (Wine) = 10 and U (Tea) = 0 or, equivalently, 4 or -2.67.
In this context, ordinal measures of utility are all that counts, but
cardinal utility is meaningless—such that summing and comparison
are impossible. Arrow and Hahn, Debreu, Hicks, Samuelson, among
many others, had been convinced of the primacy of this model for
economic science since the forties. The revealed preference model is
the basis for the interpretation of the utilities found in our microe-
conomic textbooks. Nevertheless, the same model of utility is likely
to be used in other chapters of these textbooks, those which tackle
issues of welfare economics, and even applied public economics. In
this context, social welfare is hence supposed to depend on individ-
ual utilities alone, which only represent individual choices. The use of
this model in welfare economics is heavily criticized for several reasons
(e.g., Hausman 2012). For one thing, it ignores the fact that individu-
als may act against their own interests: for instance, a knowledgeable
person who continues to smoke, or a penniless young man who prefers
to work for a low wage rather than concentrate on his studies. More
generally, we cannot distinguish actions by interest, lack of informa-
tion, whether they are based on false beliefs or lack of will, constrained
by social norms, etc. As a consequence, it is difficult to interpret the
concept of utility corresponding to the strong preference model as the
well-being of the person, and even more as relevant information to
compute social welfare.
While the strong model of preferences—i.e., revealed preference
theory—is mostly retained in economics, most philosophers prefer to
retain a weak model of preferences, as we shall now set out. They
claim that utility stands for specific kinds of preferences: they should
be rational, informed, and based on true beliefs (e.g., Hare 1981, Grif-
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fin 1986, Sumner 1996). The introduction of these conditions has two
consequences. First, this model answers most of the criticisms that
plagued utilitarianism both in its hedonist version and in the strong
preference model. Second, it implies that, for utilitarianism, the rel-
evant preferences are not actual preferences: the latter should rather
be ‘laundered’ (Goodin 1986)—notice that the issue of who should
be entitled to perform the actual task of laundering preferences when
utilitarian policies are implemented remains open so far.
Further, if you suppose we know the rational and informed prefer-
ences, and if you can transform each individual utility by any positive
monotonic function f(.), then you can design some ordinalist utilitar-
ianism where:
W =
∑
i∈N
f(ui(x))
It has been shown that the Rawlsian ranking is a special case of all
utilitarian ordinalist functions, where the concavity of f is extreme
(Arrow 1973).
3 Anti-utilitarianism
The scope of criticism of utilitarianism is wide, whether on ethical
grounds or on practical issues. As we shall see, such criticism can be
accommodated by utilitarianism with refinements. However, this crit-
ical movement has also induced a sort of ‘non-utility revolution’, both
in political philosophy and normative economics. Notice that most
alternative approaches would not call themselves anti-utilitarian—
though a notable exception is the M.A.U.S.S. project (in French, the
“Mouvement Anti-Utilitariste dans les Sciences Sociales”; see, e.g.,
Caille´ 2006)—but at most post-welfarist.
3.1 Ethical limits of utilitarianism
The principle of aggregation has been criticized for being a mere sum
of utilities which rules out any distributive considerations. Indeed, in
a crude version of utilitarianism, it is considered socially equivalent to
give a large amount of money either to one rich person or to a myriad
of poor people who would be able to change their quality of life thanks
to it. This example runs against moral intuitions and should induce
the rejection of the theory. Yet it seems implausible to claim that
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equality has never been a concern of utilitarian thinkers. In a old and
standard assumption, that goes back not only to the precursors of the
marginalists, but also to the first utilitarians, the marginal utility of
money is decreasing. In order to maximize the sum of individual util-
ity, it is therefore socially better to give an extra euro to a poor person
than to give the same extra euro to a rich one: for the former act is a
bigger producer of utility than the latter. A way of representing the
egalitarian functions of social welfare is specifically to retain a utilitar-
ian utility function with concave individual utility functions. In this
sense, the criticism over the issue of distribution holds only for crude
versions of utilitarianism where one euro is supposed to provide the
same amount of utility to any person; yet this case is more important
than we might think at first sight, in view of Robbins’s claim that the
assumption of decreasing marginal utility was a normative one and
should consequently be kept away from economic science. Neverthe-
less, even with some given concave utility function, the choice of the
criterion of sum (or average) may have consequences that collide with
distributive concerns. Utilitarianism can judge certain inequalities as
socially better in so far as they contribute to increasing the sum of
utilities. For example, it may be appropriate to give subsidies to a
rich businessman rather than using the same amount of money to im-
prove the fate of worse-off children if the extra utility associated with
the grant is higher than that associated with assistance. Some utili-
tarians are comfortable with this criticism since it implies, after all,
an increase in the sum of utilities: the decisions of the businessman,
they say, may provide more jobs and wealth in a wide area, increasing
the welfare of numerous families in a way likely to compensate for the
low quality of the children’s lives. Opponents of utilitarianism then
return with another example, where the unquestioned new increase
of welfare only accrues to families that were already well-off. While
the choice of examples in this vigorous debate seems crucial to deter-
mine which side is more convincing, it remains that there exist cases
where the utilitarian criteria shall favor the rich over the poor, the
well-off to the needy. In the end, it remains that distributive issues
may be important in utilitarianism, yet only on instrumental bases.
This dependency on utility as the sole intrinsic value still generates
unquestionable violations of equality concerns.
Beyond the issue of equality, the utility principle is likely to justify
the sacrifice of minorities. In a famous example, utilitarianism under-
writes the Roman spectacle of the circus. In the arena, a few Christian
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martyrs suffer a great deal, while each spectator derives a little plea-
sure from observing their suffering. If the spectators are sufficiently
numerous, the sum of their low positive utilities shall compensate for
the pain of the few Christians.
More generally, the focus on utility implies possible violations of
any liberal rights. According to an interpretation of Sen’s theorem of
the Paretian liberal (1970), it is impossible to attribute an intrinsic
importance to utility while simultaneously endorsing a specific concept
of freedom. This interpretation has been generalized on the basis of
other results pertaining to utility and other values.
Sen has called “welfarism” the doctrine according to which social
welfare only depends on utility and on no other values or informa-
tion (Sen 1979a,b). All versions of utilitarianism are fundamentally
welfarist. But welfarism is a problem firstly because it implies the
rejection of any other values (or at least it subsumes them). Some al-
ternative theories consider that a plurality of values should be at stake
for welfare issues: they make a case for a multidimensional account
of welfare, such as quality of life or capabilities (Nussbaum and Sen
1993), complex equality (Walzer 1983), etc. Secondly, utility may not
be the suitable information for gauging social welfare, because it en-
tails counterintuitive consequences. After Sen’s famous paper “Equal-
ity of what?” (Sen 1979c), it has been common to consider alternative
informational bases of justice such as primary goods (Rawls 1971), re-
sources (Dworkin 1981a,b), access to advantages (Cohen 1989), welfare
opportunities (Arnerson 1989), opportunities (Roemer 1999), etc.
Utilitarianism considers that utility, which is important for indi-
viduals, is also the relevant information for resolving issues of jus-
tice. Some regret the confusion of justice and morality in utilitar-
ianism, where goodness is prior to fairness. Conversely, in other
traditions—mainly political liberalism—morality focuses on every in-
dividual’s judgement of what is good or bad; justice concerns all so-
ciety and tackles the issue of living together, no matter what the in-
dividuals’ differences, and even considering divergences in their moral
views. Consider the usual case of conflict of interests: utility, even if
perfect for one individual, is hardly suitable for improving social wel-
fare. The redefinition of welfare imposed in utilitarianism in order to
circumvent the absence of natural conjunction of interests raises funda-
mental problems regarding the integrity and the autonomy of persons.
Firstly, utilitarianism may force individuals to sacrifice something to
benefit others, including total strangers. For instance, utilitarianism
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is likely to justify the execution of innocent people to prevent rioting
and consequent numerous deaths, where raising the general welfare
is presented as a serious justification for the innocent’s deaths. Sec-
ondly, utilitarianism imposes negative responsibilities. Individuals are
as responsible for what they do not do as for what they do: people
have the responsibility to pursue better social consequences, and not
just better consequences for themselves (Williams 1973). It is debat-
able, however, on what basis utilitarianism can impose upon people a
goal that is not a priori supposed to be theirs. Thirdly, Rawls (1971:
26–27) claims that utilitarian neutrality implies the loss of the essen-
tial separateness of individuals, such that some human beings may be
used as a means to the welfare of others.
On [a utilitarian] conception of society separate individuals
are thought of as so many different lines along which rights
and duties are to be assigned and scarce means of satis-
faction allocated in accordance with rules so as to give the
greatest fullfilment of wants. [...] The correct decision is
essentially a question of efficient administration. [...] Util-
itarianism does not take seriously the distinction between
persons. (Rawls 1971: 27)
This argument quickly become famous within the debates over utili-
tarianism, and has been greatly discussed and refined (see, e.g., Parfit
1984). Rawlsian political liberalism, in which fairness is prior to good-
ness, constitutes the most famous alternative to utilitarianism.
Fourthly, another family of ethical criticisms concerns the demo-
cratic failures of utilitarianism when its implementation is at stake, as
we shall have cause to see below.
3.2 Practical limits of utilitarianism
Though welfarism, and especially welfarism based on subjective util-
ity, is widely used in normative economics, the empirical facts hardly
confirm that people are indeed utilitarian. Nozick (1974) imagined an
“experience machine”, which has been fatal to hedonist utilitarianism.
Individuals are offered the chance to be plugged into a machine for
life. The latter would feed signals into their brain so that they felt
wonderful experiences, irrespective of what was actually happening
in the world. Since people do not (in general) prefer the happiness
machine to their actual life, it seems to follow that the mental state
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of happiness is not everything that is valued by these people. The
preference model does not do better in this regard. In their seminal
article on normative experimental economics, based on a survey, Yaari
and Bar-Hillel (1984) highlighted in particular that the assessment of
income distributions turned on needs rather than on tastes or beliefs,
as utilitarians would claim. According to an important and robust
result of normative experimental economics, the way people judge the
fairness of situations depends on contextual circumstances and not on
the mere description of individual utilities. For example, for similar
utility levels, an even split of a resource between two persons is not
judged as being equal when survey respondents learn that one recip-
ient is hard working and disabled while the other is lazy and already
in receipt of benefits. Utility thus does not seem in fact to be the sole
important value, and nor is it the sole relevant source of information
in people’s eyes.
Notably defended by S. E. Toulmin and J. Austin, rule utilitarian-
ism had already been clearly formulated by J. O. Urmson and R. B.
Brandt in the fifties. It supposes that the consequences of rules are
assessed, and that actions—and also therefore classes of actions—are
judged, according to rules. Harrod (1936) raised an important prob-
lem with rule utilitarianism on the basis of a famous example. A lie
is a bad thing, and a good rule should be not to lie. But in special
cases a lie is likely to induce better outcomes—although it would be
judged negatively by rule-utilitarianism, contrary to a priori intuition.
Accordingly, act utilitarianism, where every action is assessed through
its actual consequences, is favored. This other version of utilitarianism
was defended originally by Bentham, Sidgwick and Moore, and by J.
J. C. Smart in the debates of the fifties. Against act-utilitarianism,
however, some have complained that it is unable to guide practical
decision making: because of lack of information, because gathering
such information would be too tedious and costly, because mistakes
are more likely to be made when there are so many calculations to be
done, and because existing rules or norms could not be used to build
expectations nor in particular to trust others’ promises. In a nutshell,
rule-utilitarianism requires approximations and generalizations which
are likely to conflict with the utility principle in certain concrete cases,
while act-utilitarianism requires unworkable computations.
Notice that the possibility of measuring utility and implementing
utilitarian policies depends on the choice of the utility model. If utility
were a mental state, it would be quite difficult to consider the different
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natures of pleasures on a common scale, in so far as many a priori seem
incommensurable. The model of experience in play here also entails
some counter-intuitive consequences. For example, as long as Mary
does not know that she has been ruined on Black Tuesday of the 1929
Crash, she has not experienced her misfortune. Whereas it is impos-
sible to deny that her utility—as experienced happiness—remains as
high as when she was a wealthy lady, it is also hard to accept that she
remains as well off as before. Moreover, it is impossible—or, rather,
difficult—to measure, compare, and add feelings, i.e., subjective util-
ities. As we have already underlined, the preference model supposes
individual ordinal rankings that are not easier to compare nor to add.
This again hampers actual implementation of utilitarian policies.
A famous criticism of utilitarianism is based on Michel Foucault
(1975)’s analysis of Bentham’s Panopticon. The Panopticon is a “sim-
ple idea of architecture” (Bentham 1791: 5), which determines the
organization of life in a prison as a first step. Bentham’s project
was to apply this in many other areas of social life, such as homes
for the poor, schools, hospitals, public administration, factories, etc.
The prison cells are arranged concentrically around a central building
where an inspector is located: he personifies the otherwise fictitious
impartial spectator. He can observe each person’s action, and every-
thing that happens. Prisoners are kept separate from the others and
from the spectator, of whom they know only they might be being
observed.
Hence the major effect of the Panopticon: to induce in the
inmate state a conscious and permanent visibility that as-
sures the automatic functioning of power. (Foucault 1975:
234)
The inspector reflects the behavioral expectations of the whole society,
and the prisoners feel in their flesh the pressure of the utility principle:
hence their own autonomous desires are transformed now so as to feel
and act in order to improve the greatest happiness for the greatest
number: individuals gradually become their own jailer. As all that
is needed here is the thought that there might be an inspector, who
may be anybody: he may be changeable or even absent, such that the
system seems free from any drift towards tyranny—precisely in accor-
dance with the requirement of impartiality. It remains that individual
autonomy is here being totally neglected in favour of social utility: the
disciplinary system organized by the Panopticon guarantees the total
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submission of individuality to the collectivity, as in an authoritarian
regime.
This democratic failure may be seen in the preference model as
well. In theory, an impartial spectator properly computes utilities
and suggests which policy will best improve social welfare. In practice,
utilitarian policies suppose that some experts have made the utility
computation in the name of the other individuals. In the ideal pref-
erence model, the computation also supposes they launder individual
utilities. What is the actual legitimacy of such experts? How can we
be sure that such an utilitarian elite may desire and succeed in pro-
moting the good for the mass of people? The problem would not arise
if a normative demarcation of the scope of expertise were possible.
Under such a demarcation, experts could be contracted within a well-
defined area in which they are responsible solely for making factual
observations and computations. The citizens would have previously
decided that the policy should be utilitarian, such that the experts
would use utilitarian models to derive their prescriptions. As a con-
sequence, expert decisions based on utilitarianism would legitimately
proceed from the will of individuals, although in fact implemented by
an expert. The possibility of such a demarcation is, however, doubtful
(Baujard 2013). In the end, this objection again recalls the issue of
the lack of democracy in the elaboration of actual policy recommenda-
tions and the implementation of utilitarian policies. An alternative to
utilitarianism hence supposes the introduction of theories of democ-
racy within welfare economics, e.g., following Sen’s more recent ideas
(Sen 2009).
Conclusion
In seeking to deepen her understanding of this subject, the reader
will quickly find herself within a wide arena of impressively numerous
primary and secondary references on utilitarianism and its criticism.
Glover’s introduction to and collection of utilitarian texts (Glover
1990), as well as his thematic bibliography (Glover 1990: 251–255),
provide a useful guide within this otherwise daunting literature.
Unquestionably, utilitarianism has evolved and developed since its
appearance in the 18th century. In order to retain the essential kernel
of the theory—that what is important for society is that individu-
als have high utility—authors have sought creative responses to the
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tensions raised by the opposition between positive and normative def-
initions of utility, and individual and collective definitions of welfare.
Utilitarianism has consequently been permanently modified and re-
fined. This constant adaptation has made utilitarianism into the most
important ethical theory in the Anglo-Saxon world, and in particular
within the evolution of welfare economics.
Whenever the theory has been modified to repel strong criticism,
it has increased its theoretical stability while aggravating its practical
fragility. It hardly appears possible to answer both the practical and
ethical objections raised against the utilitarian—or at least welfarist—
bases of welfare economics. The ethical criticism returns when the
theory is to be applied and implemented in concrete settings, i.e.,
when the formulation of actual policy recommendations is at stake.
Conceived and reconstructed on the bases of the most refined versions
of contemporary utilitarianism, a welfarist welfare economics may be
bound to remain a beautiful but vain theory, as is indeed presaged by
the news of the death of welfare economics. Considering the practical
stakes, going beyond utilitarianism, and even beyond welfarism, in
welfare economics, may now prove to be an absolute necessity.
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